In the managerial myopia literature the firm always faces some agency problem or other market imperfection. It is unclear whether the myopic behavior found in these models is due to stock-based incentives or the model's other market imperfections. This paper points out that stock incentives do not lead to myopia unless they result in more emphasis on the short-term than would occur under an optimal contract. The paper shows there is an arbitrarily large range of parameter values such that optimal contracting and traditional first-best standards come to conflicting conclusions with regard to whether equilibrium incentives result in myopia.
Introduction
While there is a large literature on corporate myopia, 1 the papers in this literature share two related features which merit additional attention. First, the papers in this literature compare equilibrium outcomes to first-best outcomes in order to judge the efficiency of stock-based incentives and to determine whether stock market incentives induce myopic behavior. However, all of these models employ other market imperfections. Thus it is unclear whether the myopic behavior found in these models is due to stock-based incentives or the other market imperfections in the models. Second, these papers uniformly assume the manager to be risk neutral. However, typically managers are very small in terms of their wealth relative to most large corporations. They would demand an exorbitant risk premium if forced to absorb all the potential losses of the corporations they manage. Expressing payoffs in units that are meaningful for large corporations, managerial utility functions are extremely risk averse to fluctuations in corporate value. Thus it would not be optimal to try to implement first-best actions in these environments: this would create a highly inefficient allocation of risk. The only reasonable criterion for efficiency is second-best efficiency. The reasonable comparison is to the actions that could have been implemented under an optimal contract. This paper extends the current literature by deriving the optimal contract, given the market imperfections in the model, and compares incentives for myopic behavior under stock market incentives to the behavior induced by the other market imperfections under the optimal (second-best) contract. Modeling managers as risk averse and using a secondbest welfare criterion complicates the analysis. However, we are able to apply the techniques developed in Banker and Datar (1989) to derive the characteristics of the optimal contract with risk averse management and determine the extent to which myopic behavior is induced by stock market incentives.
Deriving incentives provided by the optimal contract and using them as a baseline for judging the performance of stock-based incentives is not merely a matter of methodological significance. In general, there will be a region in which findings of 1 Narayanan (1985) , Stein (1988) , Stein (1989) , Thakor (1990) , Bebchuk and Stole (1993) , Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) , Thakor (1993) , and Narayanan (1996) are some important examples. myopia relative to a first-best standard will be overturned. Depending upon parameter values, this region can be arbitrarily large. The analysis solves in closed form for the parameter regions in which these reversals occur and shows that it is crucial to control for the other market imperfections before evaluating the impact of stock-incentives on intertemporal allocations.
The model assumes that the stock market cannot perfectly predict the firm's future cash flows. Instead the market can only observe the firm's future cash flows with measurement error. The stock market is completely rational and efficient in that the market value of the firm is the present value of the firm's cash flows given all information available to the market. 2 The basic idea is as follows: the firm will only receive a higher stock price today for boosting a future cash flow to the extent that the market can observe today that the future cash flow will indeed increase.
Consider the typical case in which the stock market can estimate the firm's near-term cash flows more precisely than the firm's long-term cash flows. If the manager could costlessly transfer a dollar of cash flow from the long-term to the short-term, it would increase its stock price today beyond that called for by the time-value of money. The reason for this is that the stock market can only estimate the firm's distant cash flows very imprecisely. Thus, the market will see very clearly that the firm's near-term cash flows have increased but will not be able to detect very precisely that the firm's long-term cash flows have decreased. The precise information that the firm's near-term cash flow has increased will cause the current stock price to move up by more than the extent to which the stock price will decrease due to the hazy information that a future cash flow may have decreased. Thus a manager acting to maximize current stock price would be willing to transfer cash flows from the long-term to the short-term at a greater ratio than called for by the discount factor.
However, before such behavior can be labeled stock-induced myopia, it must be compared to behavior under the optimal contract. In the presence of moral hazard, there is a tension between (i) optimal risk sharing and (ii) the incentives required to implement first-best actions. A manager has much lower risk tolerance than a large corporation.
Thus there are risk-sharing benefits to emphasizing the more predictable components of firm value in managerial compensation. First-best incentives ignore these risk-sharing benefits. In the typical case in which near-term projects are less uncertain than long-term projects, optimal contracting incentives will cause the manager to give more emphasis to short-term projects than would occur under first-best incentives. Stock incentives can be properly viewed as inducing myopia only if they result in greater emphasis on short-term projects than would occur under the optimal contract. This paper shows that the risk sharing benefits from emphasizing short-term projects in managerial compensation can play a large role in optimal contacting, and, for a sizeable range of parameter values, can reverse myopia findings based on a first-best standard.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes behavior under stock market incentives. Section 4 examines behavior under optimal contracting. Section 5 solves for the region in which first-best and optimal contracting standards lead to differing conclusions with respect to myopia. Section 6 discusses the paper's bearing on the Jensen-Stein myopia debate. Section 7 describes the papers policy and empirical implications. Section 8 reviews the literature. The paper concludes with Section 9.
The Model
We consider the case in which the firm finds it necessary to pay the manager as a function of the current stock price due to a moral hazard problem. The model is based on Bresnahan, Milgrom, and Paul (1992) and Paul (1992) . Milgrom and Roberts (1992) use a very similar model to examine stock-based myopia. However as will be seen below, the present paper's conclusions differ greatly from those in Milgrom and Roberts' treatment.
The firm consists of 2 projects: Project 1 is a near-term project; its cash inflows will occur in period 1. Project 2 is a long-term project; its cash inflows will occur in period 2.
At time 0, the manager allocates an unobservable resource (such as effort) to each project. 3 Let x 1 be the amount allocated to Project 1 and x 2 be the amount allocated to Project 2. Since the allocations x 1 and x 2 are unobservable, the firm has a moral hazard problem. The manager has a preferred alternative use for the resource and so bears a private cost V(x) from the resource allocation where x = x 1 +x 2 . The present value of the cash flow from project t is C t = f t (x t ) + θ t t = 1,2 where f t (x t ) is the component of the period t cash flow that results from the resource allocation, and θ t is a random shock that affects the cash flows in period t.
The variables x 1 , x 2 , x, θ 1 , θ 2 , and the cash flows C 1 and C 2 are all unobservable at time 0. However there are informed investors in the stock market who observe Y 1 and Y 2 where Y t is a measurement of the cash flows from project t.
ε 1 and ε 2 are measurement errors that are independent of the payoffs C 1 and C 2 .
The informed investors are risk neutral and competitive. Let W be the manager's wage and P be the stock price. The firm is financed entirely with equity. 4 Since investors are risk neutral and competitive, the stock price is determined by the following equation:
Note that the stock market is (strong-form) efficient in that the informed investors do not make any profits from their private information; it is fully reflected in the stock price.
3 Unlike Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) , the manager's type is known, only the resource allocation is unobservable. 4 All of the paper's results hold in the case in which the firm has risk-free debt in its capital structure: Simply replace all references to the stock price with the firm's total market value (debt and equity combined) and replace all references to the firm's stock with the firm's total assets. If compensation contracts are based on the firm's market value rather than the value of its equity, the linear inference required for the model's results is preserved. The only remaining item to check is that the firm cannot increase the efficiency of contracting by writing compensation contracts that treat the market value of debt and the market value of equity separately. It is easy to see confirm that contacting separately on debt values cannot increase the efficiency of contracting since the value of risk-free debt contains no information about managerial actions. Thus no information is lost by simply summing the market value of equity and the market value of debt and writing compensation contracts on this composite. If the firm has risky debt outstanding, then the market value of debt will in general contain information about managerial actions which an optimal contract is likely to treat differently from the market value of equity. When risky debt is outstanding, one must treat the analysis presented here as an approximation to the ideal results from optimal contracting.
The firm makes the manager's wage a function of the stock price and, thereby, indirectly uses the market's information Y 1 and Y 2 to compensate the manager. Let W(P) be the manager's wage function. We will require W(P) to be nondecreasing. Otherwise the manager would have the perverse incentive to drive down the value of the firm's assets in any region in which its wage were decreasing in the stock price.
The principal reason for the use of stock-based compensation is to proxy for the terminal payoff of the firm's assets in situations in which the terminal payoff of the firm's assets cannot be observed or contracted upon. For firms with large retained earnings and firm-specific assets, the terminal value of the firm's assets cannot be observed until liquidation. For a long-lived firm, this may not occur until well after the lifetime of the manager (if at all).
The manager can receive a certainty equivalent of W o by working elsewhere in the economy. So the firm must make the manager an offer which leaves it with at least a certainty equivalent of W o , or else the manager will reject the contract.
The sequence of events is as follows. The firm sets the wage contract so as to maximize the ex-ante value of the firm E[C 1 + C 2 -W]. The manager then unobservably allocates resource level x 1 to Project 1 (the short-term project) and x 2 to Project 2 (the long-term project). The manager does not know the realizations of any of the random variables in the model (θ 1 ,θ 2 ,ε 1 ,ε 2 ,Y 1 ,Y 2 ) at the time it sets x 1 and x 2 . Informed investors then observe signals Y 1 and Y 2 which result in a stock price of
, and the manager is paid W(P).
Models in the myopia literature typically involve firms or managers with unknown types who engage in myopic behavior as a signaling mechanism. In the current model, the firm's characteristics are common knowledge as are the manager's. The agency issue strictly involves hidden actions in that the manager's effort levels are unobservable to outsiders and not verifiable or contractible. 5 We make the following assumptions:
5 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and the Bebchuk and Stole (1993) myopia models also involve hidden actions with no hidden types. (Bebchuk and Stole (1993) actually contains two models. The model which finds myopia involves hidden actions and known types. The model which finds excessive emphasis on the long-term involves visible actions and hidden types.) (A1) The production functions satisfy f t ' > 0 and f t " < 0 with f lim θ Var where ρ is the correlation between θ 1 and θ 2 .
Note that (A3) allows the variables θ 1 and θ 2 to have any arbitrary correlation ρ. This contrasts with Paul (1992) which required the random variables analogous to θ 1 and θ 2 to be independent.
This model makes minimal assumptions about the manager's utility function, the firm's technology, and the shocks to the firm's cash flows. In particular, we will be able to consider the case in which there is no permanent component to the shocks to the firm's cash flows (ρ = 0).
Incentives With Stock-Based Compensation
In this section we look at how stock price incentives affect the resource allocation between the short-term and long-term project. First, however, we must solve for the stock market pricing equation. Since (C 1 ,C 2 ,Y 1 ,Y 2 ) has a joint normal distribution, the expectation E[C 1 + C 2 | Y 1 ,Y 2 ] is linear in a constant and the market's measurements of the firm's future cash flows Y 1 and Y 2 .
The equilibrium price and the manager's wage are known constants given Y 1 and Y 2 .
Therefore,
Together with Eqn (1), this yields
Since E[C 1 + C 2 -W | Y 1 ,Y 2 ] = P, this reduces to
Let T(P) = P + W(P). Since W(P) is nondecreasing, T(P) is strictly increasing in P and, therefore, invertible.
wage = W(T -1 (βo + β 1 Y 1 + β 2 Y 2 ) ).
Resource Allocation
In this subsection, we will examine the manager's incentives to allocate resources to the near-term and long-term projects. We can break the manager's decision down into 2 parts:
Problem 1: For any given total resource level x, maximize EU(W(T -1 (βo + β 1 Y 1 + β 2 Y 2 ) )) with respect to x 1 with x 2 set equal to x -x 1 .
Let ψ(x) be the maximized value of EU(W(T -1 (βo + β 1 Y 1 + β 2 Y 2 ) )) found in Problem 1.
Problem 2:
Maximize ψ(x) -V(x) with respect to x.
The solution to Problem 1 determines the manager's relative incentives to allocate resources to Project 1 versus Project 2. Thus, only Problem 1 is relevant for an analysis of the manager's incentives to behave myopically. In Problem 1, the manager chooses x 1 so as to maximize
with x 2 set equal to x -x 1 . Note that x 1 only affects β o + β 1 Y 1 + β 2 Y 2 through its effect on β 1 f 1 (x 1 ) + β 2 f 2 (x-x 1 ) and that
in terms of first order stochastic dominance. Therefore, since U, W and T -1 are increasing, the manager's objective in Problem 1 is equivalent to maximizing
with respect to x 1 . This objective is concave in x 1 . From the first-order condition, we have that, under stock-based compensation, the manager will set x 1 such that
where
Investors understand the manager's incentive problem and can solve for the resource allocations it will choose in equilibrium. Thus while investors cannot observe x 1 and x 2 , they have rational expectations and understand that x 1 and x 2 will be set to their equilibrium values. Therefore, investors take x 1 and x 2 to be known constants and x 1 and x 2 do not affect the expressions for β 1 and β 2 given above. (Also see Stein (1989 ), Paul (1992 .)
The closed-form expressions for β 1 and β 2 are unwieldy. However, they are simply the coefficients from the projection of C 1 + C 2 on Y 1 and Y 2 when we allow for correlation between θ 1 and θ 2 . 6 Intuitively, these beta formulas are exactly the large sample regression formulas for OLS regression where the LHS sample data has the same distribution as C 1 + C 1 and the data for the RHS variables have the same distributions as Y 1 and Y 2 .
Eqn (3) determines the extent to which the manager will allocate resources to the long-term project versus the short-term project. In order to determine the efficiency of these incentives and whether they induce myopic behavior (or excessive emphasis on long-term projects), we need to solve for the allocation of resources under optimal contracting. This is discussed in Section 4.
The Second-Best Solution
The predominate standard used in the myopia literature to judge the efficiency of stock-based incentives to guide intertemporal resource allocation has been first-best efficiency. However first-best efficiency may not be the relevant criterion. In all the models in this literature, the firm faces some agency problem or other market imperfection. Even if stock market incentives were able to implement the optimal 6 Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) .
contract to deal with this market imperfection, it could still only obtain second-best efficiency. In the current paper, for instance, the firm suffers from a moral hazard problem and thus would not be able to achieve the first-best outcome even if it could contract directly on the stock market's information Y 1 and Y 2 . 7 In order to isolate the inefficiencies due to the use of stock-based incentives, we now solve for the optimal contracting solution in which the firm can contract directly on the stock market's information Y 1 and Y 2 and use this as our benchmark with which to judge efficiency. 8
In this benchmark case, the firm would want to pick a wage function W(Y 1 ,Y 2 ) and effort levels x 1 and x 2 so as to maximize 9
subject to
Constraint (5b) is the incentive compatibility constraint which requires that the manager find it in its self-interest to pick (x 1 , x 2 ) when faced with wage contract W(Y 1 ,Y 2 ).
Constraint (5c) is the participation constraint that says that, with wage function W(Y 1 ,Y 2 ), the manager is willing to accept the contract rather than take the certain payoff W o elsewhere.
Recognizing the risk aversion of the manager and the second-best nature of optimal contracting severely complicates the analysis. However, the tools developed in Banker and Datar (1989) allow us to handle these issues. To use the results in Banker and Datar (1989) , we make two additional assumptions in this section: 7 In the moral hazard model, the only way to get the resource allocation to the full-information, first-best level is to hire the manager with an incentive contract such that the manager will find it in its self-interest to choose the first-best allocation. Unfortunately, such a contract will place excessive risk on the riskaverse manager. At the first-best allocation, the marginal benefit of reducing the manager's risk premium will, in general, be greater than the marginal cost of reduced output caused by moving away from the firstbest allocation. Thus the second-best contract, which recognizes that the manager's risk premium is a function of the specified allocation, will call for a different allocation than the first-best contract. 8 This will control for the inefficiencies due merely to the resource allocations being unobservable. 9 Italics are used for the wage function W(Y 1 ,Y 2 ) used in the optimal contract based to avoid confusion with the wage function used in stock-based compensation: W(P).
(A4) w ≤ W ≤ w -. There are real constants w and w -such that manager's wage is bounded by w from below and w -from above. This analysis holds for all finite values of w and , w no matter how extreme. So this assumption does not limit the applicability of the theory in any serious way.
(A5) The first-order approach to solving (5a)-(5c) is valid. This will hold if the cost of effort function V is sufficiently convex or if the production functions f 1 and f 2 are sufficiently concave. Alternatively, see Jewitt (1988) for sufficient conditions to apply the first-order approach.
Under these conditions, Banker and Datar (1989) show that the optimal wage function will have the following separable form: 10
Var(Y 1 ) and
Var(Y 2 ) and w' > 0
The optimal contract forms a linear aggregate of Y 1 and Y 2 with loading α 1 on Y 1 and loading α 2 on Y 2 and then makes the manager's compensation a (possibly nonlinear) function of this linear aggregate. The constant µ t is the Lagrange multiplier that measures the importance of the incentive compatibility constraint on x t in the principal's programming problem. 11 Here we see that the loading on information about project t in the (second-best) optimal contract will be:
(i) increasing in the marginal value to the principal of the resource in the project (µ t f ' t ).
(ii) decreasing in the extent to which marginal value of the resource is also reflected in the signal about the other activity. 10 In the equation below, Var(Y 1 ), Var(Y 2 ), σ 1 , σ 2 , and ρ are exogenous parameters and α 1 , α 2 , µ 1 , µ 2 , f 1 ', f 2 ', and w' are endogenous to the system. Also note that wage function w may be nonlinear. 11 Differentiating (5b) with respect to x 1 gives us the incentive compatibility constraint on x 1 . µ 1 /V" is the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint. Differentiating (5b) with respect to x 2 gives us the other incentive compatibility constraint. µ 2 /V" is its Lagrange multiplier.
(iii) decreasing in the imprecision of Y t as a measure of the resources allocated to the project (Var(Y t )).
Eqn (6) represents a major methodological break with Paul (1992) . Paul (1992) requires a Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) environment to ensure that linear contracts are optimal and solves for the optimal contract in the space of linear contracts. The current model instead makes Assumptions (A1) to (A5) which Banker and Datar (1989) show is sufficient for the optimal contract to have the separable form described in Eqn (6). This analysis implies that Assumptions (A1) to (A5) can be used to extent the results of Paul (1992) outside of a Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) environment.
After some algebra, 12 we obtain the following solutions for α 1 and α 2 : 13
Intertemporal Incentives at the Second-Best Optimum
In order to determine the resource allocation at the second-best optimum, we once again break the manager's decision down into 2 parts:
Problem 1: For any given total resource level x, maximize EU(w(α 1 Y 1 + α 2 Y 2 )) with respect to x 1 with x 2 set equal to x -x 1 .
Let ϕ(x) be the maximized value of EU(w(α 1 Y 1 + α 2 Y 2 )) found in Problem 1.
Problem 2: Maximize ϕ(x) -V(x) with respect to x.
As in Section 3, the solution to Problem 1 determines the manager's relative incentives to allocate resources to Project 1 versus Project 2. Thus, Problem 1 determines the manager's intertemporal incentives under the (second-best) optimal contract. In Problem 1, the manager chooses x 1 so as to maximize
where x 2 equals to x -x 1 . Once again, note that x 1 only affects α 1 Y 1 + α 2 Y 2 through its effect on α 1 f 1 (x 1 ) + α 2 f 2 (x-x 1 ) and that α 1 Y 1 + α 2 Y 2 is increasing in α 1 f 1 (x 1 ) + α 2 f 2 (xx 1 ) in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. Therefore, since U and w are increasing, the manager's objective in Problem 1 is equivalent to maximizing
with respect to x 1 . This objective is concave in x 1 . From the first-order condition, the second-best solution requires that x 1 be set so that 14
However, from Eqn (3), stock-based incentives lead the firm to set x 1 so that
This gives us the following two results:
α α , then the manager will overemphasize the short-term project relative to second best.
(ii) If
α α , then the manager will overemphasize the long-term project relative to second best.
The ratio β 1 /β 2 measures how informative information about short-term cash flows is relative to information about long-term cash flows in determining firm value. The ratio α 1 /α 2 is given by the relative importance of information about short-term versus longterm cash flows in determining the manager's marginal contribution or value-added. 15
14 Note that the first-best allocation of effort occurs when f ' 1 = f ' 2 . The ratio α 1 / α 2 determines the extent to which the second-best resource allocation differs from the first-best. If α 1 / α 2 > 1, the second-best contract allocates excessive resources to the short-term project relative to first-best. If α 1 / α 2 < 1, the opposite occurs.
Eqn (4) can also be expressed as follows: 
The most important case is that of large corporations in which the manager's risk tolerance is small relative to the variability of firm cash flows. The remainder of this paper will consider the limit as the manager's risk tolerance goes to zero when measured in terms of the variance of firm cash flows, implying w' = 0. 16 Thus from Eqn (6), µ 1 converges to f ' 1 and µ 2 converges to f ' 2 . Substituting these values for µ 1 and µ 2 into Eqn (7) yields 17
Ratios (9) and (10) have a similar structure with resource marginal productivities appearing in ratio (10) in place of information about the magnitude of the stochastic shocks to cash flows and their observability. In general, ratios (9) and (10) will not be the same.
Eqn ( Proposition 1 shows that this is not necessary. The proposition determines α 1 /α 2 as a function of the variance and correlation of the model's random variables (ρ, σ 1 , σ 2 , ω 1 , and ω 2 ) without reference to f 1 or f 2 . The proposition shows that α 1 /α 2 satisfies a cubic polynomial equation. Accordingly, it can be expressed in closed-form.
15 Bresnahan, Milgrom, and Paul (1992) and Paul (1992) introduce the notion that the stock market weights information according to its informativeness about value while optimal incentives require information to be weighted according to its informativeness about the manager's value-added. 16 All units are in terms of the firm's cash flows. For large corporations, the variability (or steepness) of the manager's incentive schedule is trivial when measured in terms of the variability of firm's cash flows. 17 Note that w' = 0 implies G t = 1 in Eqn (7). 
For ρ ≥ 0, the positive real solution to Eqn (11) exists and is unique. 18 The proof is provided in the appendix.
The optimal contract puts more weight on the signal which is the most precise observation of managerial allocations regardless of the value of other model parameters.
From Proposition 1, for ρ ≥ 0: 
One would generally expect the standard deviation of the noise in the market's ability to observe future cash flows to be increasing in the cash flow's arrival date. This condition is denoted ω 2 > ω 1 and creates a tendency for Var(Y 2 ) to be greater than Var(Y 1 ). In such cases, optimal contracting will appear to result in myopia, if judged relative to the firstbest standard.
Since managers are risk averse, there is an advantage to overemphasizing near-term cash flows in their compensation relative to first-best. The first-best criterion makes the unrealistic assumption that the manager and the corporation (the aggregate of all the firm's investors) are equally able to handle the risk associated with a unit of payoff variability. Once one recognizes that managers are risk averse, then, in the standard case in which the market's information about near-term cash flows is less variable than its information about long-term cash flows, optimal contracting will naturally place more emphasis on near-term cash flows relative to overall firm value. Before one can assess whether stock-based compensation leads to myopic behavior, one has to determine whether the additional emphasis given to short-term projects is greater than it would be under optimal contracting. If not, the "myopia" is due to moral hazard, not stock incentives.
First-Best Vs. Optimal Contract Standards: A Comparison
From Equations (9) and (10), it is clear that the criterion for myopic behavior relative to optimal contracting incentives, β 1 /β 2 > α 1 /α 2 , is not identical to the criterion for myopic behavior relative to first-best incentives, β 1 /β 2 > 1. This section examines the regions in which these criteria lead to conflicting conclusions about the presence of myopic behavior (or excessive emphasis on long-term projects) and present comparative statics results that show the effect of model parameters on the size of the region in which the first-best and optimal contracting criteria give rise to conflicting assessments.
An Example
Before presenting a general analysis, it is helpful to consider the following example in which σ 2 /σ 1 = 5 and σ 1 /ω 1 = 5. The ratio σ 2 /σ 1 determines the importance of the longterm project relative to the short-term project in determining the variable component of the firm's total cash flow. In this example, the long-term project is much more important than the short-term project in determining total cash flow. For instance the short-term project might concern decisions that pertain only to the coming quarter's cash flows while the long-term project might concern decisions relating to the firm's entire stream of future cash flows.
The ratio σ 1 /ω 1 determines how much of the uncertainty about the short-term cash flow is revealed by the signal observed by the market about the short-term cash flow (Y 1 ). Suppose the manager is making decisions at the beginning of the quarter about resource allocations to the near-term and long-term projects. Further suppose that the manager will be compensated based on the end of quarter stock price. At the beginning of the quarter there might be substantial uncertainty about the cash flow of the short-term
project. Yet the accounting numbers released at the end of the quarter might resolve a large amount of this uncertainty, particularly if the short-term project only relates to the current quarter's cash flow. In such cases, the signal to noise ratio σ 1 /ω 1 will be quite large. In this example we consider the case in which it is 5.
Figure 1 graphs β 1 /β 2 and α 1 /α 2 against the ratio of the squared signal-to-noise ratios 19 of the near-term and long-term project: (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 . The correlation parameter ρ is set to 0.5. The graph of β 1 /β 2 crosses 1 at (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 equal to 0.31 and crosses the graph of α 1 /α 2 at (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 equal to 2.81. Note that if the squared signal-to-noise ratio of the near-term project divided by the squared signal-to-noise ratio of the long-term project is (strictly) between 0.31 and 2.81, the first-best criteria would mistakenly conclude that myopic incentives exist when, in actuality, stock-based incentives are causing excessive emphasis on the long-term project. For values of (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 below 2.81, stock-based incentives place excessive emphasis on the long-term project, subjecting management to excessive risk and the firm to an excessive risk premium. The first-best comparison ignores the risk premium required to employ a 19 Since the ratios σ 1 /ω 1 and σ 2 /σ 1 are both held fixed in Figure 1 , changes in (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 along the horizontal axis are completely determined by changes in ω 2 . Nonetheless, it is useful to normalized the values along the horizontal axis to be the ratio of the signal to noise ratios (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 , rather than . 2 2 ω risk averse manager and, for all values of (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 above 0.31, concludes that stock-based incentives place excessive emphasis on the short-term project (myopia).
The region in which the first-best criteria mistakenly finds myopic behavior in Figure 1 is considerable: values of (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 ranging from 0.31 and 2.81.
Similarly, the proper cut-off for assessing whether β 1 /β 2 will induce myopia can be very far from one. In Figure 1 , the β 1 /β 2 curve crosses the α 1 /α 2 curve at α 1 /α 2 equal to 2.80.
The proper trigger for assessing whether β 1 /β 2 will cause myopic behavior at the intersection point is almost three times as high as the trigger used by the first-best criterion (2.8 versus 1). 20
This example treats the typical case in which the short-term cash flows are substantially more predictable than long-term cash flows. Given that a large corporation's risk tolerance is orders of magnitudes higher than that of an individual person, optimal contracting will link managerial pay more heavily to measures of short-term cash flows than overall cash flows (holding incentive effects constant). As demonstrated in this example, this effect can be quite large and must be taken into account before one can make judgments about the role of stock incentives in generating myopia.
General Analysis
The ratio (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 is a measure of the relative informativeness of the market's signals about short-term versus long-term cash flows in determining overall firm value. From Section 3.1 the informativeness of the market's information about short-term cash flows relative to long-term cash flows for assessing firm value is a major determinant of β 1 /β 2 and the manager's allocation of effort between the short-term and long-term projects. Accordingly, it will be useful to examine the behavior of α 1 /α 2 and β 1 /β 2 as a function of (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 , holding ρ, σ 2 /σ 1 , and σ 1 /ω 1 fixed. At this point, we introduce the additional notation:
20 The similarity between the value of (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 /(σ 2 /ω 2 ) 2 at the point where β 1 /β 2 equals α 1 /α 2 (2.81) and the value of α 1 /α 2 at the point where β 1 /β 2 equals α 1 /α 2 (2.80) is a coincidence. See Proposition 2. b(φ) determines the value of β 1 /β 2 as a function of φ, holding ρ, σ 2 /σ 1 , and σ 1 /ω 1 fixed. a(φ) determines the value of α 1 /α 2 as a function of φ, holding ρ, σ 2 /σ 1 , and σ 1 /ω 1 fixed.
In Figure 1 , the curve labeled β 1 /β 2 is a graph of b(φ) and the curve labeled α 1 /α 2 is a graph of a(φ). All of the important features of the curves graphed in Figure 1 are general:
1. In Figure 1 , b(φ) is linear in φ and strictly increasing.
Eqn (9) can be re-expressed as 21
where 21 The algebra is provided in the "Appendix for the Referee" on p.39. This footnote and the appendix are not intended for publication. 22 For b to be decreasing in φ, ρ(σ 2 /σ 1 ) must be negative and have a magnitude greater than 1 or ρ(σ 1 /σ 2 ) must be negative and have a magnitude greater than 1 + (1-ρ 2 )η. 23 Eqn (15) 4. In Figure 1 , a(φ) increases in φ more slowly than b(φ). From Eqn (15), a(φ) is strictly concave in φ and therefore increases at less than a linear rate. However, when σ 2 /σ 1 is large and σ 1 /ω 1 is small, there can be a region in which a(φ) increases more rapidly than b(φ). Even in these cases, the a(φ) curve will cross the b(φ) curve at a single point and a(φ) will increase more slowly than b(φ) at the intersection point. 25
5. In Figure 1 If a* > 1, then, for all values of φ such that b(φ) is strictly between 1 and a*, the first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused myopic behavior when, in actuality, stock-based incentives are causing excessive emphasis on the long-term project. Here the principal-agent problem is inducing myopia, not the stock-based incentives. While stock-based incentives help move the agent's allocation of the unobservable resource closer to the first-best level, they nonetheless reduce both overall welfare and the wealth of the principal (firm value), by placing excessive risk on the manager relative to what would occur in a optimal contract. This excessive risk 27 The following holds for parameter values such that the value of φ in Eqn (16b) is negative: (i) b(φ) > a(φ) for all nonnegative values of φ; (ii) stock-based incentives induce myopia occurs relative to optimal contracting for all nonnegative values of φ; (iii) if b(0) > 1, then the first-best and optimal contracting criteria always agree; (iv) if b(0) < 1, then the first-best criteria mistakenly finds excessive emphasis on the long-term project for all values of φ less than the constant S. The value of S is given in Eqn (16c). 28 The strict monotonicity of b(φ) ensures that b(φ) uniquely crosses the horizontal line with value one. 29 From Eqns (14a,b), it is easy to establish that S = (1-Q)/R which implies that φ = S at b(φ) = 1.
requires the principal to pay an excessive risk premium to the manager. The extra risk premium required by the manager more than offsets the added value that comes from having the unobservable allocation move closer to first-best.
If a* < 1, then, for all values of φ such that b(φ) is strictly between a* and 1, the first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused excessive emphasis on the long-term project when in actuality stock-based incentives have induced myopia. Now it is the principal-agent problem that causes excessive concern for the longterm, not the stock-based incentives. As in the previous case, the benefits that stockbased incentives provide by moving the agent's allocation closer to first-best are not sufficient to overcome the loss in value due to diminished risk-sharing.
From the previous two paragraphs, the direction of the conflict between first-best and optimal contracting conclusions about myopia is completely determined by the relationship between a* and one. For a* > 1, the first-best criterion finds myopia in the region of disagreement when stock-based incentives actually cause excessive emphasis on the long-term. The opposite occurs when a* is less than one. For a* equal to one, the conclusions from first-best analysis and optimal contract analysis always agree about direction but will generally differ regarding the magnitude of inefficiency.
Fortunately, it is easy to determine when a* will be above (or below) one in this model. From Eqn (16a):
(i) a* > 1 if and only if σ 2 /σ 1 > 1;
(ii) a* < 1 if and only if σ 2 /σ 1 < 1; and (iii) a* = 1 if and only if σ 2 /σ 1 = 1.
Thus σ 2 /σ 1 creates the wedge between first-best and optimal contract analysis. The intuition behind this is best understood in the simple case in which the shocks to the stochastic components of cash flows are uncorrelated (ρ = 0). Recall that the stock market's inference problem is to determine the period t cash flow. The present value of the period t cash flow is f t (x t ) + θ t . Even though x t and f t (x t ) are unobservable, participants in the stock market can solve for the model's equilibrium and therefore know what value the manager will choose for x t . Since f t (x t ) is a known deterministic constant, the market's inference problem is simply to determine θ t from the signal Y t = f t (x t ) + θ t + ε t . Since f t (x t ) is a known constant, it can be subtracted out from Y t . The market is effectively trying to infer θ t from θ t + ε t . Recall that σ t is the standard deviation of θ t and determines the strength of the signal in Y t for the market's inference problem.
Now consider the optimal contracting problem. Here the principal sets the wage contract based on a statistical aggregate designed to optimally detect any out-ofequilibrium deviations in the manager's allocations. The principal is effectively trying to determine f t (x t ) based on Y t = f t (x t ) + θ t + ε t . In the optimal contracting problem, θ t is part of noise in the inference problem and σ t determines the magnitude of this noise.
Thus σ t is a measure of noise for the contracting problem but is a measure of signal for the determination of stock valuation. (See also Paul (1992) .) Note that σ 2 /σ 1 > 1 causes market pricing to increase the weight on information about the long-term project but causes the optimal contract to down-weight information about the long-term project.
The model is perfectly symmetric. For σ 2 /σ 1 < 1, the same reasoning argues that market pricing will decrease the weight on information about the long-term project while causing the optimal contract to up-weight information about the long-term project. The relation between σ 2 /σ 1 and 1 determines the direction of the conflicting findings from first-best and optimal contract analysis.
The region in which first-best and optimal contracting criteria differ can be arbitrarily large. From Eqns (16a,c), a* can be made arbitrarily larger than 1 by sufficiently increasing σ 2 /σ 1 and can also be made arbitrarily close to zero by sufficiently decreasing σ 2 /σ 1 . From Eqns (16b,c), φ* can be made arbitrarily larger than S by sufficiently increasing σ 1 /ω 1 .
The following comparative statics results also obtain:
1. da*/dγ > 0 2. da*/dη = 0 3. da*/dρ < 0 for a* >1
4. da*/dρ > 0 for a* <1
5. da*/dρ = 0 for a* =1 where γ = σ 2 /σ 1 and η = (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 . Thus the magnitude of the difference between a* and 1 is increasing in σ 2 /σ 1 for a* greater than one, always decreasing in ρ, and always unrelated to changes in (σ 1 /ω 1 ) 2 .
Perfectly Observable Cash Flows 30
By setting ω 1 and ω 2 to zero, the model can examine the case in which both longterm and short-term cash flows are perfectly observable. From Eqn (9), the ratio β 1 /β 2 is always equal to one in this case. From Eqns (12a-c), for ρ ≥ 0:
(i) α 1 /α 2 > 1 if and only if σ 1 < σ 2 ;
(ii) α 1 /α 2 = 1 if and only if σ 1 = σ 2 ; and (iii) α 1 /α 2 < 1 if and only if σ 1 > σ 2 .
These results provide a nice illustration of the importance of using deriving the second-best optimum when assessing the efficiency of stock-based incentives. When cash flows are perfectly observable, the relative weight on short-term versus long-term incentives match those from first-best analysis. Nonetheless, once one takes managerial risk aversion into consideration, it turns out that these same stock-based incentives lead to myopic behavior iff σ 1 > σ 2 . In the opposite case in which σ 1 < σ 2 , they lead to excessive emphasis on the long-term. Note that the weights in the stock-based incentive contract are identical in both all three cases: σ 1 > σ 2 , σ 1 = σ 2 , and σ 1 < σ 2 and always match incentives in first-best. Nonetheless, the true efficiency of these incentives change as σ 1 changes relative to σ 2 and they change solely due to changes in the characteristics of the optimal contract.
One can also assess the extent to which myopia (or excessive emphasis on the longterm) is due to the unobservability of cash flows as opposed to the other elements of the model by first solving Eqns (9) and (11) for the case in which ω 1 = ω 2 = 0 and then solving them again with ω 1 and ω 2 set to their actual values. A comparison of the two sets of solutions provides the effect of cash flow unobservability on the efficiency of managerial incentives.
30 I thank a referee for suggesting that I discuss the case in which all cash flows are completely observable.
The Jensen-Stein Debate
Jeremy Stein's 1989 critique of Jensen (1986) is perhaps the paper most responsible for launching the academic literature on managerial myopia. As such, it is worthwhile to explore the implications of the current model for the findings reported in Stein (1989) .
On the first page of his article, Stein takes issue with the following passage from Jensen (1986, p.11): Sometimes it (myopic behavior) occurs when managers (emphasis added) hold little stock in their companies and are compensated in ways that motivate them to take actions that increase accounting earnings (emphasis added) rather than the value of the firm. It also occurs when managers make mistakes because they do not understand the forces that determine stock values.
From this, Stein (1989, p.655) concludes: Jensen (1986, p.11 ) espouses this point of view, arguing that managerial myopia will only be a problem if managers do not care enough about stock prices…This paper (Stein (1989) ) disputes Jensen's contention, showing that even a fully efficient market can lead managers (emphasis added) to behave myopically. Indeed the more managers (emphasis added) are concerned about current share prices, the worse the problem becomes.
In the first excerpt above, Jensen states that myopia can occur if both of the following conditions hold: a. The firm is run by managers rather than owners. b. Managers are compensated based on current earnings, rather than the firm's current value in the financial markets. Stein (1989) explores neither of these conditions. In Stein (1989) , the agent is effectively an owner who receives the current cash flow as income and then sells a fraction of its holdings in the firm at the current stock price and keeps the remainder of its holdings in the firm forever. In Stein (1989) , the agent's payoff is current dividend + π (current ex-div stock price) + (1-π) (PV of future earnings)
• π (current ex-div stock price) is the amount of the agent's compensation which comes from the firm's current valuation.
• (1-π) (PV of future earnings) is the amount of the agent's payoff which will come from its future stock holdings. 31 These are the payoffs of an owner, not a manager. The benchmark in Stein (1989) is the "π equal zero" case in which first-best efficiency is obtained by employing infinitely-lived, risk-neutral managers who bond themselves to the firm and thereby collect a fixed proportion of each of the firm's future cash flows as they arrives. Clearly this is not the benchmark that Jensen (1986) and others had in mind when they argued that stock-based compensation would reduce incentives for myopic behavior. Jensen (1986) and vary the parameter k for fixed levels of π.
The current paper allows us to consider the case in which the signals Y 1 and Y 2 are contractible data from accounting reports. When the current analysis is interpreted in this manner, it allows us to conduct the relevant comparison by comparing outcomes from compensation based on the current stock price W(P) to outcomes from compensation based on an optimal contract written directly on accounting variables W(Y 1 ,Y 2 ) and shows that stock-based compensation can lead to myopic behavior relative to optimal contracts written directly on current accounting variables. The current work provides the exact conditions under which myopia occurs. 32 Stein (1989) considers the case in which there is only one signal of firm value: current cash flow. In the current model, if we set ω 1 to zero and ω 2 to infinity, then there is only one signal of firm value and it is an exact observation of the cash flows coming from the short-term project. However, the current model gets diametrically opposed results from Stein (1989) .
Intuitively, it is clear that both β 1 /β 2 and α 1 /α 2 are infinity when ω 1 is equal to zero and ω 2 to infinity. This is confirmed by Eqns (9) and (11). When the cash flows from the short-term project are perfectly observable and the cash flows from the long-term project are completely unobservable, both the optimal contract and stock-based incentives put complete weight on information about the short-term project and no weight on the longterm project. There is no myopia relative to the space of feasible contracts. It is impossible to compensate a short-lived manager based on the unobservable results from the long-term project. But this is effectively what the first-best benchmark in Stein (1989) requires. 33,34
Policy and Empirical Implications
Recall that a * is the value of β 1 /β 2 and α 1 /α 2 such that β 1 /β 2 = α 1 /α 2 . From the monotonicity and single-crossing properties established in Section 5.2, the model finds myopia whenever β 1 /β 2 > a * and excessive emphasis on the long-term whenever β 1 /β 2 < a * . From Eqns (16a,c):
32 Myopia occurs for all values of φ greater than the value given in Eqn (16b) in Proposition 2. Long-run projects receive excessive emphasis for all values of φ less than the value in Eqn (16b). 33 Also see Mello-e-Souza (1993) . 34 I thank a referee for suggesting that I use the model to examine the case in which the results from the short-term project are completely observable.
Since γ equals σ 2 /σ 1 , this implies:
Excessive Emphasis on Long-Term iff
One of the appealing features of the model is that it is amenable to empirical testing. One implication of the model is that using the current stock price to determine managerial incentives is particularly problematic for firms in which long-term cash flows are very important (σ 2 is large relative to σ 1 ) and hard to observe (ω 2 is high). This phenomenon has been empirically documented. Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1992) use the ratio of market value to book value and the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets as proxies for the relative size and unpredictability of long-term cash flows. They find that CEO compensation becomes more deferred and less related to the current stock price as the proxies for the importance and uncertainty of long-term cash flows increase. Kole (1997) studies the restrictions shareholders place on management compensation plans.
The board of directors is prohibited from approving compensation schemes which do not meet these minimum restrictions. Kole finds that shareholders of R&D intensive firms have greater requirements for deferred compensation in that 1. The average R&D intensive firm requires restricted stock be held for a minimum of 69 months as opposed to 37 months for the rest of the sample. 2. "Hold-until-retirement plans" are rare outside of high R&D firms. 3. 41% of high R&D firms require restricted stock to be held until retirement as opposed to 23% of other firms. Lerner and Wulf (2006) examine the compensation of corporate R&D heads and find that, for companies with centralized R&D activities, innovation measured as (i) number of patents and (ii) number of patent citations is increasing the long-term incentives of the R&D head and unrelated to the level of its short-term compensation.
The model also predicts that firms in declining industries will generally have a greater problem with myopia while the inefficiencies in resource allocation for firms in rapidly growing industries will tend to arise from excessive emphasis on long-term projects. Consider the case in which the volatility of each period's cashflow is proportional to the scale of the firm: σ t = (scale t ) σ. For a declining firm, scale t is expected to decrease over time which implies σ 2 < σ 1 . For a expanding firm, scale t is expected to increase over time which implies σ 2 > σ 1 .
In the current model a * converges to zero and β 1 /β 2 approaches infinity as σ 2 /σ 1 goes to zero. Thus myopia should be a problem for firms in severe decline. On the other hand, a * approaches infinity and β 1 /β 2 converges to zero as σ 2 /σ 1 goes to infinity. Thus excessive emphasis on the long-term should be a problem for firms which are expected to grow rapidly. Many commentators in the business press have argued that this second effect occurred to many "dotcom" internet firms in the late 1990's.
These empirical implications can also be viewed as policy recommendations. While it is not clear that the model suggests any increased role for regulation, it does indicate situations in which compensation committees and compensation consultants should be especially wary of reliance on current stock valuation. If the firm feels that its best alternative is to stress current stock valuation in compensation, then Eqns (17a,b) provide guidance as to the nature of the inefficiencies which may result and which the firm may try to ameliorate through other controls.
A final policy implication is that policy makers, academics, and outside analysts should exercise caution before asserting that stock-based compensation has resulted in myopic incentives. Typically, short-term projects involve less risk than long-term projects. Thus optimal contracting, in almost any situation, will tend to favor them relative to a first-best standard, making it imperative to use the proper second-best standard before drawing any advocating any restrictions on the use of current stock valuations in compensation.
Literature Review
The current paper is concerned with whether incentives arising from the presence of publicly-traded equity such as stock-based compensation can result in myopia when judged according to an optimal-contracting (second-best) standard. A number of papers have established that imperfections in the managerial labor market can cause myopia relative to a first-best standard. The myopia in these papers is caused by the labor market, not the stock market, and would continue to hold for a private firm that did not have publicly-traded stock. 35 Thus this sub-literature, while important for understanding labor market issues, has no bearing on policy debates regarding the effects of the stock market on firm operations.
By contrast, the role of the stock market is crucial in the current paper. Here the firm uses information observed by the financial markets to improve contracting. However, part of the price of these improved incentives may be myopia. The current model cannot be applied to firms that do not have publicly-traded securities.
In the finance literature, Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) have used Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom (1982) "signal-jamming" models to show that the manager may move cash forward to boost the market's assessment of the permanent component of future cash flows generated by the firm or the manager. 36 Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) Stein (1989) above that which would have been generated by earnings-based compensation.
By contrast, the permanence of cash flow shocks in the current paper (ρ) is not a major determinant of myopia. In the current model, the current stock price contains When the relative size of these signal-to-noise ratios gets sufficiently large, the manager will overemphasize the project associated with the highest signal-to-noise ratio.
When they do find inefficiencies, Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) only find myopia. Our model finds that it is also possible for excessive emphasis to be placed on long-term projects and gives the exact conditions under which this will occur. Similarly, Bebchuk and Stole (1993) only find myopia in the case considered here in which the marginal productivity of investment is known.
36 Campbell and Marino (1994) verifies that the key results from Narayanan (1985) hold when there are lower bounds on the individual payments that can be made to the manager. 37 The persistence parameter in Stein (1989) is k which equals ρ/(1-ρ) where ρ is the intertemporal correlation of cash flows. 38 In Stein (1989) , current earnings are paid out as a dividend and the stock price used in the model is the ex-dividend stock price. Thus the stock price in Stein does not reflect current earnings but instead is the present value of the firm's expected future cash flows. This expectation is a constant in Stein (1989) in the cash in which there is no permanent component to earnings. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) use a model very similar to that presented in Sections 2 and 3 to discuss stock-induced myopia. 39 However, they compare stock-based incentives to first-best incentives in evaluating whether stock incentives generate myopic behavior.
As our work emphasizes, conclusions based on first-best efficiency are often reversed when the proper second-best criteria is used to judge the effects of stock compensation on intertemporal incentives.
Like the current model, Bebchuk and Stole (1993) , Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993), and Hirshleifer, Chordia, and Lim (2001) find conditions under which long-term projects will be overemphasized. Bebchuk and Stole (1993) finds that myopia occurs when the level of investment is unobservable but that excessive emphasis on the long term occurs when the marginal productivity of investment is unobservable. Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) Von Thadden (1995) considers external debt financing and shows that there may be conditions in which short-term debt financing is optimal and induces the firm to favor 39 See pp. 471-473. 40 While their model does not address myopia itself, Brandenberger and Polak (1996) present a signalling model which points out inefficiencies that can arise when managers care only about their current stock price. They show that if the manager's information set strictly dominates that of the market, management ignore the part of its information that is not observable to the market when taking actions that the market can observe. Thakor (1990) considers a situation in which the firm has superior information about its value relative to outside investors, causing outside investors to demand a premium when purchasing newly-issued securities. Thakor (1990) points out that this causes the firm to face a cost of capital that is higher than the symmetric information cost of capital and leads the firm to favor projects which generate cash quickly. Thakor (1993) establishes equilibria in which firms signal that their securities are undervalued by investing in short-term projects and, thereby, demonstrating to the market that they would rather invest myopically than issue securities at their current (low) market price. In Stein (1988) the value of the firm's assets is unobservable until they are liquidated. If firms are motivated solely by their current stock price, good firms will have an incentive to liquidate their assets early to reveal their value. Narayanan (1996) reverses these effects by examining compensation packages that are composed of a mix of cash and stock where the total market value of the compensation package must equal the manager's reservation wage as set by the labor market's perceptions of the manager's ability. Here two effects interact. The first effect is the source of myopia in Narayanan (1985) : The manager has an incentive to unobservably move cash forward to enhance the labor market's perception of managerial ability and, thereby, increase the market value of the compensation package. For any given compensation package market value, the percentage of the firm given to the manager is decreasing in the stock price. This generates a second somewhat offsetting effect which leads the manager to take actions that reduce the current stock price (and boost the future stock price). In Narayanan (1996) optimal contracting balances these two effects to minimize investment distortions.
None of the papers described in this section allow for risk aversion or judge the efficiency of stock incentives relative to a second-best standard based on optimal contracting.
In a recent paper Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) do consider risk averse managers but do not allow for optimal contracting. Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong remind us that myopia can occur in when stock markets are not efficient and point out that current shareholders may favor short-termism since they may benefit indirectly from the firm's ability to raise additional capital at inflated prices.
Conclusion
Since managers are risk averse, there is an advantage to down-weighting the importance of high volatility signals and up-weighting the importance of low volatility signals in managerial compensation. In the standard case in which the market's information about near-term cash flows is less variable than its information about longterm cash flows, optimal contracting will naturally place more emphasis on near-term cash flows relative to overall firm value. Before one can conclude that stock-based incentives lead to myopic behavior, one has to determine whether the stress given to short-term projects is greater than it would be under optimal contracting. If not, the "myopia" is due to agency issues, not stock compensation. Despite the large number of important papers devoted to myopia, the significance of risk aversion in setting intertemporal incentives has not been addressed by the literature.
The paper shows that one cannot rely on myopia findings relative to first-best incentives to continue to hold relative to the relevant optimal contracting criterion. The ratio σ 1 /ω 1 is the signal-to-noise ratio of the market's information about the cash flows from the short-term project. Similarly, σ 2 /ω 2 is the signal-to-noise ratio of the market's information about the cash flows from the long-term project. The manager's incentive to stress the short-term project over the long-term project is linear in the square of the ratio of these signal-to-noise ratios: optimal contracting and first-best standards come to differing conclusions in regard to whether equilibrium incentives result in myopia. This paper solves for the exact parameters in which the conclusions relative to a first-best standard are reversed when evaluated relative to the relevant second-best standard.
Alternatively, one can directly examine the relative weight placed on short-term projects versus long-term projects in managerial compensation. The paper finds that there can be an arbitrarily large range of equilibrium incentive weights which are myopic by first-best standards but not myopic when judged relative to optimal contracting incentives. The size of this region is determined by the ratio of the volatility of the longrun cash flow divided by the volatility of the short run cash flow (σ 2 /σ 1 ).
If σ 2 /σ 1 > 1, then, in the region in which first-best and optimal contracting analysis differ, the first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused myopic behavior when, in actuality, stock-based incentives generate excessive emphasis on the long-term project. In this case the principal-agent problem is inducing myopia, not the stock-based incentives. While stock-based incentives help move the agent's allocation of the unobservable resource closer to the first-best level, they nonetheless reduce both overall welfare and firm value, by placing excessive risk on the manager relative to what would occur in an optimal contract. This excessive risk requires the principal to pay an excessive risk premium to the manager. The extra risk premium required by the manager more than offsets the added value that comes from having the unobservable allocation move closer to first-best.
If σ 2 /σ 1 < 1, then, in the region in which first-best and optimal contracting analysis differ, the first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused excessive emphasis on the long-term project when in actuality stock-based incentives have induced myopia. Now it is the principal-agent problem that causes excessive concern for the long-term, not the stock-based incentives. As in the previous case, the benefit that stock-based incentives provide by moving the agent's allocation closer to first-best is not sufficient to overcome the loss in value due to diminished risk-sharing. Paul (1992) establishes that σ is part of the "noise" for the contracting problem but is part of the "signal" for the determination of stock valuation. For σ 2 /σ 1 > 1, market pricing up-weights information about the long-term project but causes the optimal contract to reduce the weight given to information about the long-term project. Similarly, for σ 2 /σ 1 < 1, the same reasoning shows that market pricing reduces the weight given to information about the long-term project while causing the optimal contract to up-weight information about the long-term project. These conflicting effects generate the wedge between first-best and optimal contracting analysis.
Paul (1992) requires a Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) environment to ensure that linear contracts are optimal and solves for the optimal contract in the space of linear contracts.
The current analysis shows how the methods developed in Banker and Datar (1989) can be used to extend the results in Paul (1992) to settings in which non-linear contracts may be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2.
A positive number b equals β 1 /β 2 and α 1 /α 2 if and only if it satisfies Eqns (14a) and (11). Therefore, b must satisfy both of the following:
Substituting this expression into Eqn (19a) implies b equals β 1 /β 2 and α 1 /α 2 if and only if b satisfies Eqn (19b) and Eqn (20) below: 
The constants R and κ are unrelated to φ. Observation 5: h'(z) = 3z 2 + 2κz -p. Observation 6: h'(z) changes sign no more than once for z positive. Proof of Observation 6. Given κ>0 and p>0, there is only one positive solution to 3z 2 + 2κz -p = 0. Observation 6 follows from the fact that h'(z) is a quadratic polynomial. / Remainder of Proof. Observations 2, 4, and 3 state h(0) < 0, h'(0) < 0 and that a positive solution to h(z) = 0 exists. This implies that h'(z) must change signs between z=0 and the positive solution to h(z) = 0. From Observation 6, h'(z) can never subsequently change its sign. Therefore, once h(z) crosses 0, for positive z, it can never cross again. The positive solution to Eqn (21) is unique.
// Appendix for the Referee (not intended for publication) Derivation of Eqn (7): From Eqn (6), The proof of Proposition 2 leaves it to the reader to verify that the solutions provided in Eqns (16a,b,c) satisfy Eqn (19a) and Eqn (19b) . Unfortunately, this involves a large amount of tedious algebra. The required algebra is provided below. 
Proof of Proposition

